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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 348 
Accident time: 10:20 Accident Date: 09/08/2001 
Where it occurred: Ward 7, Kabul Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 22/08/2001 
ID original source: FP Name of source: FP/DDG 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 21/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: MF# 
01/0101/007/0603 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group involved made available their own internal accident report. Their report is 
reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Objectives. 
The objectives with the current report are to: 
Establish a plausible cause to the accident 
Evaluate and review relevant SOPs within the [Demining group]. 
1 
Produce beneficial information to the demining community within MAPA [MAC]. 
 
General Information: 
Team/Site description: Section 1, Team No. 2, Kabul  
Location of accident: MF# 01/0101/007/0603, Ward 7, Kabul 
Date and time of accident: On 09 August 2001 at 1020 hrs local time 
Cause of the accident:  Disarming AT Fuse 
 
Brief description of injuries:  
Right Hand:  
Thumb: Amputation of distal phalanx 
Fore finger: Amputation of distal phalanx 
Middle finger: Amputation of middle phalanx 
Left Hand:  
Little finger: Amputation of distal phalanx 
Ring finger: Amputation of distal phalanx 
Minor injuries around mouth and on cheeks and chin. 
 
Chronological Overview of the accident: 
Following describes actions taken and the instructions given directly after the accident: 
One deminer in team two notified his Section Leader that he had found a fuse in his lane. The 
Section Leader removed the fuse by lifting it and left the lane. Once back to his control point 
he decided to disarm the fuse by using a needle. When he opened the booster the fuse 
detonated. (See Annex B)      
The 2nd Section Leader of team No. 2 contacted the Team Leader (who was at the briefing 
area) by VHF about the accident and informed him about the name of Section Leader.+ 10 
Sec. 
The Team Leader announced that an accident has happened in Section No.1, Team No. 2, 
instructed all the teams to stop operations and instructed the ambulance to get to the Pick Up 
Point D. In addition he ordered the nearest Paramedic to reach the accident point from the 
safe cleared routes. + 20 Sec. 
Field operations of all 3 teams immediately stopped and all field personnel were instructed to 
remain in their positions until further orders. + 25 Sec.  
The nearest deminer and the second Section Leader performed first aid to the injured. + 1 
min. 
The Paramedic arrived to the accident point and started further treatment. + 2 min. 
The ambulance and Paramedic Supervisor arrived to the Pick Up Point D. + 5 min. 
The Team Leader informed the Operations Centre about the accident. + 6 min. 
The injured reached the ambulance and the Paramedic Supervisor applied life saving 
procedures and first aid to the injured that took 6 minutes.  + 12 min. 
The injured went up to Pick Up Point by his feet with the assistance of two de-miners, a 
Section Leader and a Paramedic. He reached the ambulance in 3 minutes.  + 15 min. 
The 2nd Section Leader of team No.2 was appointed acting Team Leader by the Team 
Leader of team No. 2 and the Team Leader joined the injured and Paramedic Supervisor in 
the ambulance.  + 15 min. 
Islamabad Office was informed about the accident by Operations Centre.   + 15 min. 
The ambulance with Paramedic Supervisor and Team Leader left for Karti-Se Hospital and 
reached there in 15 minutes.  + 30 min. 
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The ambulance, Kabul and Islamabad offices were standby at the same HF channel from the 
minefield up to the Hospital. 
All field staff left for the site compound after the departure of the ambulance.  + 45 min. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer, Operations Officer, Training Control Officer and Medical 
Supervisor arrived to the hospital and then to the minefield for initial investigation. Initial 
information and technical evidence relevant of the accident was collected.  +130 min. 
 
Injuries of the Casualty  
The Section Leader has the following injuries: 
Right Hand:  
Thumb   The distal part distal phalanx is amputated 
Forefinger The distal part of distal phalanx is amputated 
Middle finger The distal part of distal phalanx is amputated 
Ring finger The distal phalanx is totally amputated 
Little finger Ok 
Palmer view Minor wounds 
 
Left Hand:  
Thumb  The distal part distal phalanx is amputated 
Forefinger Amputated from proximal end of middle phalanx (amputated 4/5     d
Middle finger Amputated from distal end of proximal phalanx (4/5 part of      p
Other fingers Ok 
Deltoid Muscle: Minor injury 
Middle Side Palmer View: On tenor muscle has small wounds. 
 
General Condition of the injured: 
Head: Ok 
Lips: Small wounds 
Chin: Small wounds 
Cheeks: Small wounds 
Teeth and mouth cavity: Ok 
Eyes: One eye has hemorrhagic Congectiva 
Ears: Ok 
Neck: Small wounds on anterior view on coracoids cartel age level  
Chest: Ok 
Abdominal: Ok 
Inguinal Area: Ok 
Lower Extremity: Ok 
 
Equipment Damaged and Technical Evidence: 
Equipment Damaged: 
The Section Leader was wearing the protective suit properly. He was not wearing his visor. 
The blast had effect on the collar and shoulder parts of protective suit; small fragments 
penetrated the nylon cover and were stopped by the first layer of Kevlar. Six metal fragments 
penetrated into five layers and two fragments penetrated out all 15 layers of the protective suit 
at the bottom of both shoulders and caused minor injuries to the Section Leader 
 
Technical Evidence: (See Annex D) 
The MVZ 57 AT fuse was found at the accident point that was taken by the injured Section 




In order to accumulate experiences within the SOP of The [Demining group], it is of great 
importance to evaluate and review all actions taken during and after the accident. 
Following SOPs are relevant to evaluate and review with regard to the current accident: 
- Operations SOP 
- Medical SOP 
In addition to the above, the [Demining group] will distribute the report to the mine action 
organizations within MAPA. It is the [Demining group]’s intention to contribute in a 
constructive and critical manner with its experiences of the current accident. This will enable 
us to assist other mine action organizations to hopefully eliminate or reduce risks that are 
common in the process of de-mining undertaken by the other mine action organizations. 
 
Demining SOP 
Relevant factors:  
The injured has been working with the [Demining group] since 20 July 99 and he is 41 years  
old.  
The injured is an experience Section Leader and has 9 years experience with the Mine Action 
Program in Afghanistan. He had worked with [two other demining groups] before joining the 
[Demining group]. 
The injured was not wearing the complete protective ensemble used within the [Demining 
group]. He was only wearing the protective suit and was not wearing the visor. 
A deminer in his section found an AT fuze and informed him. He went and removed the fuze 
out of the lane without informing his Team Leader and started to disarm it. 
The injured said that he was not tasked by anyone to disarm the fuse. He wanted to give the 
disarmed fuse to the Training Control Officer for teaching purposes. 
Neither the Training Control Officer nor the Team Leader instructed him to disarm the fuze. 
The accident occurred in the control point of the Section Leader. 25m from the nearest 
working deminer. 
 
Injured’s own version of the accident: 
The injured is in a fairly good and stable condition and was able to answer questions related 
to the accident. The following describes how the accident occurred from the injured own point 
of view: 
Q. How did the accident happen? 
At 1000 hrs I was at the control point when a deminer of my section yelled “Mine”. I reached 
the said deminer and saw that an AT fuze was lying in his lane. I removed the fuze and took it 
to the control point and started disarming. I opened the booster explosive and detonator from 
the fuze. I had a pin and started to remove the booster explosives with it. When the pin 
touched the detonator the accident happened. 
Q. Refer to the [Demining group] OPS SOP you are not entitled to disarm or move dangerous 
things from their locations. Why did you take and move the fuze and started to disarm it? 
This was the first time that my section found an AT fuze. I was thinking that it might be better 
to disarm the fuze and show it to all deminers in order to be familiar with this kind of fuze and 





Summarizing all factors mentioned above, procedures and regulations have been violated 
according to the current OPS SOP within the [Demining group]. 
The Section Leader Leader was not authorized to disarm the fuze or move it from one place 
to  another and had to report it to the Team Leader.  
The Team Leader should have enough command and control over his Section Leader in 




All deminers within the [Demining group] have received a basic first aid course. 
Paramedic was situated approximately 200 meters from the accident point. 
To put the medical treatment given after the accident in right perspective it is relevant to give 
an overview of the [Demining group] reporting SOP with regard to an accident: 
Section Leader calls the Team Leader to announce an accident has taken place (where and 
who). 
Team Leader orders, “STOP” in the entire minefield. 
Team Leader orders Paramedic Supervisor and ambulance to the nearest Pick Up Point.  
Team Leader/Section Leader orders the nearest breaching party to clear the area around the 
injured and perform the first aid to the injured (if in un cleared area). 
Team Leader orders the nearest Paramedic to the accident point. 
Team Leader moves to the accident point. 
 
Treatment 
The 2nd Section Leader of Team No. 2 and a de-miner, Paramedic and Paramedic 
Supervisor performed first aid, stabilized and prepared the injured for evacuation and more 
specifically: 
Stopped bleeding 
Bandage the wounds 
Stabilized the hands 
Injected various painkillers 
Prevented shock 
Performed psychological first aid 
The whole process of the medical treatment and stabilization from the time of the accident to 
the hospital took 30 minutes. 
 
Summary 
The medical treatment and evacuation was adequate and contributed to keep the patient in a 
good and stable condition up to and during the evacuation to the hospital. However, the 
medical reporting of injuries was not accurately reported at the initial stage from the field due 
to stress from both sender and receiver.  
The Medevac and Casevac exercises will take place continuously among Paramedics, 
Paramedic Supervisors and deminers to obtain the highest possible level of individual medical 




Review and briefing of the accident to the organization  
On 10th August 2001, the [Demining group] staff (Operations Officer, Training Control Officer, 
Medical Supervisor) conducted evaluation and briefing sessions in the site compound in order 
to: 
Review in details what happened during and after the accident 
Discuss the cause of the accident  
Discuss the medical treatment given to the injured 
Emphasize that OPS and Medical SOPs are to be strictly followed and respected 
Further enforce rules and regulations for disarming or moving items from the minefield. 
 
Conclusion: 
Following is the conclusion made by the [Demining group] internal investigation board: 
Accident: 
The accident was found to be caused by a clear violation of the OPS SOP. 
Cause: 
The Section Leader removed the fuze and started to disarm it. During the disarming process 
the accident occurred. The type to device was a MVZ 57 fuze from AT mine TM57. 
Medical: 
As a whole the medical treatment and evacuation was conducted and performed satisfactory. 
However, the recognition of injuries by the Paramedics and Paramedic Supervisors should be 
emphasized.  
Protective Equipment: 
The use of protective suit was adequate and satisfactory. But unfortunately the visor of the 
Section Leader was up during the disarming that caused him minor injuries to his face.   
Reporting: 
Further radio training for both sender and receiver should be emphasized, in order to get an 
adequate statement already in the first radio transmission. 
Disciplinary Action: 
The disciplinary action is under evaluation and will be revised once the Section Leader has 
recovered from his injuries. 
Islamabad, August 22nd 2001. 
   
Victim Report 
Victim number: 440 Name: Name removed 
Age: 41 Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 30 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket 
 







Fingers Both hands 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the victim was 
apparently not aware that he should not attempt to disarm the AT mine fuze. It seems likely 
that he did not understand the risk that he was taking by prodding into a detonator. 
The investigators identified a failing of discipline higher in the field management (the Victim 
was low in the control chain), but did not identify any actions to prevent a recurrence. They 
expressed an intention to “discipline” the Victim after he had recovered, but not to improve 
training of supervisors or to discipline those in direct charge of the Victim. The secondary 
cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim should not have been 
allowed to act as he did.   
 
Related papers 
The demining group made available their Accident report form, which is reproduced below 
(edited for anonymity). 
 
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON MINE INCIDENT 
An Accident is termed as “Mine Incident”, when a Mine or UXO initiated during mine action 
operations causes injury or death to personnel or damage to equipment. 
At Work Site 
• The nearest man gives first-aid until paramedic arrives. 
• All deminers suspend work and sit in the work lane until asked to move to the rest 
area.  
• The wounded man is moved to cleared area. Photographs of site and casualty are 
taken. 
• All out effort is made to stabilise the wounded person within 15 minutes. 
• The patient is sent to hospital within 60 minutes from the time the patient is 
evacuated in to the safe area on the site. The primary method of evacuation is by 
road. 
• On the next day, the team will discuss the accident in detail and do refresher training.  
Further details are available in SOPs of [Demining group]. 
 
Incident Reporting 
Interpreter/Driver at site establishes radio contact with [Demining group] Kabul Office and 
reports the accident. The [Demining group] Kabul Office in turn reports by radio to [Demining 
group] Islamabad and RMAC Kabul.  
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The [Demining group] Kabul Office must submit written accident report within 2 hours to local 
RMAC and META HQ. The [Demining group] Islamabad office should inform MACA 
Islamabad within 3 hours. Example of written report is at Annex A.   
 
Evacuation by Air 
The following priorities describe the casualty’s condition to ascertain the mode of evacuation: 
Priority 1: Casualty may die if hospital treatment is not received within 6 hours; or, Road 
evacuation is highly likely to worsen the casualty’s condition to such an extent that death may 
result. 
Priority 2: Casualty is seriously injured and may die if hospital treatment is not received within 
6 to 12 hours; or, Casualty may lose eyesight if hospital treatment is not given within 6 hours. 
Priority 3: The condition of casualty is not life threatening. He will be moved to a medical 
facility external to [Demining group]. 
Priority 4: The condition of casualty is not life threatening. He can be treated within [Demining 
group]. 
The Medical Officer at site assesses the priority and advises [Demining group] Kabul and 
Islamabad of any requirement for air evacuation or any changed circumstances. 
An air evacuation request (Annex B) is to be forwarded to MACA and nearest RMAC. 
The evacuation is monitored and the concerned hospital is advised about the ETA of 
casualty. At all stages of the evacuation process, the casualty is to be accompanied by a 
paramedic or doctor.  
If air evacuation takes place to a destination in Pakistan, the concerned airport is to be 
approached in advance for permission to take the ambulance to the apron. Advance 
arrangement for an ambulance from airport to hospital are to be made. 
If the air evacuation is not approved, keeping in view the availability of aircraft, condition of 
landing strip, weather condition, security clearance and time frame; then either the evacuation 
will take place by road or the treatment will continue at local hospital.  
 
Incident Investigation 
Investigation will be conducted by: 
a) A formal “board of inquiry” if the accident involves death of personnel. 
b) The META, in most other cases involving injury or damage. 
c) The [Demining group] will carry out primary investigation in all cases. A detailed Mine 
Accident Report (Annex C)  will be compiled as soon as possible after the accident. 
 
Insurance 
All [Demining group] staff are covered by insurance. The coverage is trauma oriented and in 
addition it covers natural death. 
An injury and Treatment Record (Annex D) is to be compiled as soon as the treatment has 
started. On completion of treatment of the injured person, a certificate is issued by the treating 
specialist giving the details of disability. In the event of death, a death certificate will be issued 
by the hospital concerned or the local authorities when the dead cannot be evacuated or is 
buried locally at the field location. 
Insurance claim is initiated supported by treating specialist’s certificate and a photograph 
identifying the injured and showing his injuries or losses. See Annexes E and F for insurance 
claim. The original forms provided by the insurance company are to be utilized. 




Please refer to following MACA SOPs for further details:  
Incident Reporting: OPS 7.2.6 
Incident Investigations: OPS 7.2.7 




URGENT   URGENT   URGENT
Date and Time:  
From:   NGO HQ 
To:   MACA, Islamabad, META, Peshawar 
Subj: MINE INCIDENT REPORT 
 
1. Agency:   NGO name 
2. Team/Site description:     
3. Location:   Task No. 
4. Date & Time:    
5. Particulars of injured person:  
6. Description of injuries: Traumatic amputation of left leg and Serious injuries 
to right leg. 
7. Treatments given:  . 
8. Current condition of casualty:  
9. Priority:    
10. Evacuation routes/destination:  
11. Equipment damaged:   
12. Brief of accident:  
13. Other information:   
  a. Accident occurred in …. 
  b. Device type: PMN 
  c. Further details will follow. 
 
Annex B 
URGENT   URGENT   URGENT
 
Date & Time:  
From:  Site Office Kabul 
To:  RMAC Kabul 
  [Demining group office] Islamabad 
Subject: AIR EVACUATION REQUEST 
1. Agency, Site Office, Team Number: 
2. Location (Province, District, Village): 
3. Date and Time of accident: 
4. Name and father’s name of personnel requiring evacuation (including 
doctor/medic): 
5. Description of injuries: 
6. Current condition and priority of casualties: 
a. Condition (Critical, Serious, Satisfactory) 
b. Priority (see list of priorities mentioned above) 
c. Can patient sit or is a stretcher required: 
7. Proposed evacuation routes: 
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d. Pick-up point: 
e. Destination: 
8. Condition at proposed pick-up airstrip: 
f. Security: 
g. Weather: 
(1) Rain: ( Light rain five hours ago. No rain since. ) 
(2) Cloud: ( 10 % cloud cover; mostly clear skies ) 
(3) Wind: ( Light wind from north-east direction ) 
(4) Visibility: ( 10 Km ) 
h. Airstrip: 
(5) Runway Length: ( 1300 m ) 
(6) Runway Width: ( 15 m) 
(7) Runway Type: ( unsealed dirt ) 
i. Clearances: 
Local authorities have approved the use of airstrip. 
 
9. Any other information: 
 
 
Annex: INJURY AND TREATMENT RECORD 
This report is to be commenced as soon as treatment is started. All treatment administered to 
the casualty is to be recorded. This report is to be maintained until the patient is admitted to 
hospital. A copy should be provided to the hospital at the time of admission and a copy should 
be retained by the NGO HQ for the accident investigation. 
 
PART ONE 
This part of the report is to be completed by the treating paramedic and should accompany 
the casualty from the injury site to the FMU or next medical care location. This part of the 
report enables the treating paramedic to provide basic information to assist with further 
diagnosis and treatment. 
 
Casualty Name: …………………………………………………………………….. 
Injury occurred: Date………………Time………………Location………………………. 
Male      Female  Age……………Severity of injury: Fatal    Severe    Minor  










IF Internal Haemorrhage 
L Laceration 
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Medical Aid Commenced: ……………………….(time) 
Initial vital signs at injury site: 
Time:…………….. Pulse:…………..……. BP:…………..….. Resp:…………………. 
Oxygen Given? Yes       No  
Haemorrhage Control:Tourniquet   Pressure Bandage   Elevation   Not Applicable  
Intravenous Infusion?  Yes       No  
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